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The aim of this chapter is to challenge the argument popular among ‘critical urbanist’ 
writers that the subprime crisis in the US played a crucial and necessary role in the US 
and UK financial crisis. It will be argued that this view exaggerates the role of the 
subprime crisis and of the global interconnections between banks.  Instead, it is 
argued that the banking systems in the US and UK had developed in a fundamentally 
unstable way and that this was the primary cause of the financial crises in these 
countries, with the subprime crisis playing at most a contingent contributory role.  
The focus will be on the structure and operation of the UK banking system and the 
UK experience of the financial crisis. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
very limited reforms that have so far been implemented.  
 
THE ‘CRITICAL URBANIST’ INTERPRETATION OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS  
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The analysis of subprime lending 
 
The term ‘critical urbanist’ interpretation is used here to refer to two strands of 
argument: one concerns international finance flows, and one concerns sub-prime 
lending. Harvey combines both strands. He argues that global capitalism has a 
permanent under-consumption problem and staggers from one crisis to the next; and 
that the exhaustion of profit opportunities in one sphere or country leads to a search 
for profit in new sectors of activity, or cities, regions or countries which then undergo 
booms and slumps (Harvey, 2010: 28-31). As a result, he identifies trends such as the 
internationalization of banks, the increasing investment in assets such as property and 
the growth in consumer credit which, he argues, make good the decline in US 
purchasing power.  
 
For Harvey, the rise in subprime lending and the subsequent crisis over repayment is 
due to the expansion of capital into a sphere which it had not previously penetrated, 
namely owner-occupation among low-income households.  The strong role that this 
view gives to subprime lending can be seen when Harvey says that ‘the crisis that 
began in highly localized housing markets in the United States in 2007 quickly spread 
around the world via a tightly networked financial and trading system that was 
supposed to spread risk rather than financial mayhem’ (2010: 140) and that ‘by the 
autumn of 2008 the ‘subprime mortgage crisis’, as it came to be called, had led to the 
demise of all the major Wall Street investment banks through change of status, forced 
mergers or bankruptcy.’ (2010: 2.)  
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In order to consider this argument, we start by examining critical urbanist academic 
writing on mortgage lending. We then go on to look at evidence on the scale of the 
subprime crisis to see whether it can bear the weight that is being placed on it.  
 
 
Sub-prime loans are those made to borrowers whose ability to repay is considered 
uncertain and/or whose housing is considered to be a poor risk, and for whom tougher 
conditions, such as higher interest rates, are charged.
 1
  (In contrast, prime loans are 
made on more favourable terms). Sub-prime loans do not need to be used for house 
purchase: they can also be used for the refinancing of old house purchase loans, home 
improvement, or equity takeout for consumption spending (Immergluck, 2009: 68-72, 
159-160; Newman, 2009). 
 
Mortgage lending involves banks in making decisions on how much to lend and on 
what terms, to whom and on what dwellings.  According to conventional economic 
models, lending decisions reflect judgements about the value of the dwelling as 
collateral for the loan, and about the ability to repay of the borrower. The key idea is 
that loan terms should reflect risk. However, there is a long critical tradition in urban 
geography and housing research which argues that this model is not accurate and that 
US mortgage lending is characterized by red-lining (i.e. red lines are drawn around 
areas in which prime loans will not be granted) and a refusal to lend to racial minority 
groups (Aalbers, 2011). For writers who reject the risk-based approach to lending, any 
place, income or race based variation in lending is evidence of discrimination. For 
those who accept that lending should be risk-based, on the other hand, only variation 
that goes beyond what is attributable to the greater riskiness of certain types of 
 4 
dwelling, area, income group or racial minorities is evidence of discrimination. The 





A recent study by Wyly et al (2009) provides comprehensive evidence on these 
patterns of variation. It uses two exceptionally large national US individual level data 
sets covering over eight million loans approvals in 2004 and 2006 and allows the 
impact of place, race and income (but not dwelling) to be taken into account. The 
authors fit several models that explain lending patterns in terms of various household, 
lender and area characteristics. However, their best model explains only 35% of the 
variance and so is far from offering a full understanding of the factors in play – 
housing characteristics are an obvious omission. Its main conclusion is that in 2006 
African-Americans were 3.8 times more likely than white Americans to obtain a 
subprime loan when income was not taken into account. When income was included, 
this figure reduced to between 2.3 and 3.3 depending on the model used, showing that 
African-Americans are more likely to obtain a subprime loan after income differences 
are controlled for. The study also showed that this likelihood had increased between 
2004 and 2006.   
 
This empirical result leads Wyly et al (2009) to elaborate a critique of US mortgage 
lending practice which they see as remote from the conventional economic model of 
well-informed buyers having their lending risk assessed by careful salespeople in 
terms of explicit criteria.  Firstly, Wyly et al (2009) argue that subprime loans were 
(increasingly) marketed to many people who could have afforded prime loans. This is 
a surprising point since it implies that people who did not need to pay the higher 
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subprime interest rates nevertheless did so. An explanation for this ‘market 
imperfection’ is advanced by Immergluck (2009: 141-2) and Newman (2009: 318) 
who describe the aggressive marketing methods used to promote subprime loans, the 
higher fees paid to salespeople as incentives to sell subprime loans, and the 
unfamiliarity of the new group of borrowers with mortgages and the interest rates they 
would be paying. Secondly, Wyly et al argue that lenders are bad at distinguishing 
good and bad risks, and that to avoid ‘charlatans’ (i.e. unreliable borrowers) they 
ration credit on supply rather than price (2009: 335), e.g. by drawing red lines on the 
map or by discriminating on the basis of ethnicity.  
 
Hence the critical urbanist view is that subprime lending is not risk-based as the 
conventional economic model would suggest and that it generates an undeniable 
racial bias in U.S. subprime lending. 
 
Standing back from this evidence on lending patterns, it is interesting to look at the 
interpretations placed upon it. Firstly, the evidence does not lead Wyly et al to 
demand that lenders reform their practices and adopt ‘risk-based pricing’.3  Instead, 
they use it to attack the very notion of ‘risk-based pricing’, claiming that ‘the theory4 
of risk-based pricing has become doctrine and ideology, used for well over a decade 
to blame consumers for the consequences of an abusive industry, to justify a 
deregulatory stance that encourages ‘usury’ as innovation, and to sustain the mirage 
of an ‘American Dream’ backed by high-risk, predatory credit’ (2009: 350). Others 
more familiar with the US housing scene will be able to judge the merits of these 
claims. However, there can be no doubt that Wyly et al see risk-based pricing as the 
fount of most if not all evil in the US housebuilding and mortgage industries. This 
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position is somewhat surprising since at the same time these authors claim that risk-
based lending has not been practised.  
 
Having constructed risk-based pricing as a ‘theory’, Wyly et al then go on to propose 
their own theoretical alternative for understanding sub-prime lending, namely, 
Harvey’s analysis of class-monopoly rent. Harvey’s (1977) classic analysis of 
mortgage lending patterns in Baltimore in 1970 showed how different lenders 
operated in different neighbourhoods, leading to low interest rates and strict housing 
code inspection in more affluent areas, and high interest rates and weak inspection in 
poor areas. However, paradoxically, he showed that even at that time high interest 
loans were being given in run-down inner city areas to ethnic minorities rather than 
that all loans were being refused as the standard redlining story has it. But Harvey’s 
analysis of segmented markets in mortgage lending does not, in my view, require an 
acceptance of the notion of class monopoly rent. Nor is it obvious what analytical 
purchase class-monopoly rent theory offers in understanding subprime lending today. 
It is not clear that any class exercises monopolistic control over housing, land or 
finance and the theory does not lead to usable hypotheses about how subprime loans 
are promoted, by whom, to whom and on what conditions. Certainly, Wyly et al’s 
effective empirical demonstration that income and race are factors affecting subprime 
lending does not require acceptance of the theory of class-monopoly rent.    
 
Finally, if one is left confused by Wyly et al’s theoretical argument, one is left even 
more confused by their policy recommendations. Mortgage lenders seem to be blamed 
for not lending and for discriminatory non-risk-based lending, and also for their 
ideology of risk-based pricing. Does this imply that Wyly et al believe that there is a 
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right to home ownership with a prime mortgage for households of all incomes, 
irrespective of differences in risk? This confused vision propagates the possibility of 
homeownership for all and underplays the need for private and social rented housing 
with rent subsidies, controls and protection of tenants’ rights for households who 
cannot afford homeownership. 
 
The relevance of this strand of academic writing to understanding the subprime crisis 
is that, having accurately identified subprime loans as a source of real difficulties for 
poor and minority households who find themselves enmeshed in financial transactions 
which often lead to arrears or foreclosure, critical urbanists exaggerate the role of  
subprime lending in the wider financial crisis and do not consider the numerous 
sources of instability in the wider financial system. 
  
Evidence on the role of subprime lending in the financial crisis 
 
To explore the argument that subprime lending played a key role in the financial crisis 
in the US which had international repercussions
5
, we need to examine evidence on the 
scale and trends in this lending and trends in the issuing of mortgage-backed 
securities
6
 based on subprime loans since it is the rise of these ‘toxic assets’ that is 
held to have precipitated the collapse of confidence among banks. 
 
New subprime mortgage lending in the US rose from 8.6% of total residential 
mortgage lending in 2001 ($190bn out of $2,215bn) to 20.1% in 2006 ($600bn out of  
$2,980bn (Gotham, 2009: 365).  Moreover, as Immergluck points out, in the 2002-6 
‘second boom’ in high risk lending, loans were more likely to be for house purchase, 
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to be ‘exotic’ products, e.g. those with low initial interest rates which increased 
sharply later, those with low down-payments or those with high loan to value ratios 
(2009: 71, 87-91). Secondly, Immergluck shows that ‘the issuance of mortgage-
backed securities in the subprime market increased from $87 billion in 2001 to almost 
$450 billion by 2006’ and a related loan type, Alt-A loans (in between prime and sub- 
prime loans), showed a similar sharp rise from $11bn to $365bn (2009: 94-5). There 
is thus evidence of the rise in volume of an increasingly risky type of mortgage and of 
securities based on it. 
 
Thirdly, foreclosure rates for subprime loans rose from 5.7% in 2005 to 17.0 % in 
2008 Q2 (Immergluck, 2009: 136) and by 2008 28% of US subprime loans were 45 
days in arrears, compared with 14.5% of Alt-A loans and 8% of prime loans (IMF, 
2009: Figure 1.21). Immergluck pinpoints the start of the ‘2007-8 mortgage crisis’ as 
being April 2007 (2009: 183).
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 However while this data demonstrates fast growth in 
the issuing of subprime loans and subprime backed securities, it does not demonstrate 
that this growth was either the main cause or even the precipitating factor in the 
financial crisis.  
 
The following counter-arguments need to be considered. Firstly, subprime loans were 
never more than a minority (20%) of all mortgage loans and they were dominated by 
other types of mortgage such as prime mortgages, corporate mortgages, credit card 
debt, and student and car loans. It has not been demonstrated that other types of asset-
based loans were any less problematic than subprime mortgages. Secondly, total US 
asset-based securities based on assets other than residential and commercial 
mortgages rose from $400bn in 1996 to $2,400bn in 2007 (FSA, 2009: Exhibit 1.5). 
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Thus subprime-based securities ($450bn in 2006) represented under 20% of total 
securitized credit. Thirdly, the securitization process combined mortgages of different 
types and what happened to subprime mortgages may have been mitigated by the 
experience of other types of mortgage. Fourthly, as will be shown below, there were 
numerous other sources of instability besides subprime loans, such as derivatives 
trading and the shadow banking sector. 
 
Thus the fact that subprime loans were disproportionately likely to end in arrears and 
foreclosure (the subprime crisis) and that these problems were concentrated among 
the lowest income groups and racial minorities, does not prove that this crisis was the 
trigger that caused the wider financial crisis.  On the one hand, the effects of the other 
developments in mortgage markets just listed need to be assessed, On the other hand, 
there were many other sources of instability, all of which contributed to the financial 
crisis, which are considered below. At most, therefore, the sub-prime crisis was a 
contingent and partial rather than a necessary or sufficient cause of the financial crisis. 
 
AGAINST THE CRITICAL URBANIST INTERPRETATION: A. THE CONTEXT   
 
In this section we consider the global, policy and regulatory context in which US and 
UK banks acted. 
 
Global macro-economic imbalances 
 
At the level of the world economy a critical context is the five-fold rise in macro-
imbalances on current account between 1998 and 2008. This means that countries 
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which are running a current account surplus, such as China, have ended up holding 
debt mainly in the form of what was then considered low-risk or risk-free government 
debt of deficit countries such as the US (Bank of England, 2009: 48). The expanded 
volume of these balances drove down interest rates which had the paradoxical effect 
of binding the US and Chinese governments together and so arguably aiding global 
political stability. The low interest rates in turn fuelled a credit expansion especially in 
the US and UK (but also in Spain and Ireland) which led to cheaper mortgages, rising 
house prices and banks becoming less concerned about creditworthiness. Thus the 
boom in bank lending was due in part to the supply-side effect of the rise in global 
macro-economic balances.  
 
Central bank policy  
 
Central banks are inclined to blame external forces for negative national economic 
trends. However the role of central banks was not passive since they adopted loose 
monetary policies. The UK House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee received 
very different responses regarding their relevance from Jacques de la Rosière, 
Chairman of the EU High Level Group on Financial Supervision and from Mervyn 
King, Governor of the Bank of England. For the former, the ‘piling up over 10 or 15 
years of easy—too easy—monetary policies’ is a fundamental factor  (along with 
global macroeconomic imbalances) (House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, 
2009, Q352), while for the latter ‘Wherever monetary policy was loose, it certainly 
was not in the UK,’ (House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, 2009: Q479) 
Likewise, the report by the UK Financial Services Authority on the causes of the 
 11 
financial crisis makes no reference at all to government policy (or the role of 
regulatory authorities) as a factor at either global or UK levels (FSA, 2009: 11-38).  
In fact, de la Rosière’s view is the more convincing. In no EU countries were housing 
costs included in the consumer price index whose level central banks targeted 
(Goodhart, 2009: 2). This means that they targeted low inflation but ignored asset 
price inflation. Their policies therefore contributed to the uncontrolled expansion of 
lending. 
 
Loose monetary policies were also a response to the demand for increased credit as 
US and UK households sought to preserve their standards of living in a period of 





In the USA, the Glass-Steagall Act was passed in 1933 to prevent banks engaged in 
retail deposit taking from also engaging in investment banking, which ranges from 
advising on mergers and acquisitions and underwriting share issues to trading on 
behalf of the bank (‘proprietory trading’). The post-war fragmented regionalized 
banking system with its local regulators gave way by the 1980s to a system in which 
nationwide banks emerged subject to federal regulation. Banks were allowed to merge 
in part to avoid strict state-level controls on interest rates, and securitization (see 
below) was encouraged. Deregulatory pressure from the 1980s onwards led to the 
abolition of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 and fuelled the expansion of retail banks 
into more risky activities, such as dealing in mortgage-backed securities. (Some 
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banks, such as Goldman Sachs, remained purely investment banks.) Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, the government housing finance agencies, became important players in 
securitization (Gotham, 2009).   
 
In the UK, the special relationship between government and finance capital has a long 
history from London’s pre-modern position as a trading centre, to the Depression and 
post-war period when low inflation and the value of sterling were placed above full 
employment as policy goals and ‘short-termism’ became the conventional critique of 
the City by British business. More recently, the treatment of financial services as an 
economic sector which could promise the UK a post-industrial future has been given 
high priority by successive governments. This sector grew from 5.5% of GDP in 1996 
to 10.8% in 2007 helped by the deregulatory turn of policy in the 1980s which 
strengthened London’s position as a financial centre vis a vis New York. 
 
Prior to the general election in 1997, Labour leaders were desperately keen to win the 
support of business to avoid the risk of an ‘investment strike’, the great fear of Labour 
governments historically (Miliband, 1961). Led by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, 
they thus wooed City leaders and assured them that it would be ‘business as usual’ if 
Labour was elected. The incoming Labour government in 1997 introduced two 
innovations: the Bank of England was made independent and tasked with keeping 
inflation at a low level and a Financial Service Authority (FSA) was created through 
the merger of specialized regulators. (In 2001 the FSA also gained responsibility for 
mortgage lending, previously under a specialist regulator.) The Bank of England staff 
responsible for its previous role as regulator of individual banks were transferred to 
the FSA. The words ‘light touch’ described the FSA’s  regulatory approach, although 
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this term emerged later as a critique of the FSA.  (The FSA was and is financed by the 





Crucial to the success of light touch regulation was the performance of the economy 
where, according to the then Chancellor, Gordon Brown, the boom and bust cycle had 
been transcended and a way found to achieve unbroken economic growth. Light touch 
regulation was partly a matter of economic philosophy and partly a matter of ‘what 
works’.  According to Lord Turner, Chair of the FSA, 
   
‘I think there was a philosophy of regulation which emerged, not just in this 
country but in other countries, which was based upon too extreme a form of 
confidence in markets and confidence in the idea that markets were self-
correcting, which therefore believed that the fundamental role of the 
supervision of financial institutions, in particular banks, was to make sure that 
processes and procedures and systems were in place, while leaving it to the 
judgment of individual management to make fundamentally sensible 
decisions.’  (House of Commons Treasury Select Committee 2009: Q2156) 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the regulation of the finance sector in both the US 
and UK has been weak. In the 1980s, self–regulation and a multiplicity of specialist 
regulators with few teeth were the norm. The term ‘regulatory capture’ (Wilson, 
1980), devised in studies of public-private sector relations to refer to the situation 
where the regulated are in control of the regulator, was only too apt. The FSA seemed 
to be acting on behalf of the finance sector rather than as its regulator.  
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Financial regulation showed the generic shortcomings of regulation.  The ideology 
was that effective regulation meant maintaining good relations with the regulated and 
relying on education, persuasion and setting an example rather than imposing 
financial penalties or taking firms to court.  Regulators depended on information 
supplied by the regulated, often had less specialist expertise than the regulated, 
offered salaries which were too low to attract the most able, and employed staff 
whose loyalties were divided since their careers would continue in the industry being 
regulated, etc. (Miller, 2009). In addition, there was an assumption that self-interest 
would ensure good behaviour, i.e. the finance industry would not take inordinate risks 
that threatened its own survival. 
 
To explore further what is meant by regulation it is useful to examine its organization 
and forms. Normative theories of financial regulation see it as a means of a) 
protecting individual financial institutions, the financial system and society generally 
against the risk of a bank collapse, and b) protecting clients, especially uninformed 
‘retail’ clients, as opposed to professional clients. Regulation thus applies 
differentially to financial institutions depending on their level of riskiness and their 
clientele. Institutions which are not ‘public-facing’ or which are considered less risky, 
such as insurance companies and securities firms, are most lightly regulated. Unlike 
banks, they are not in the inherently risky position of borrowing short and lending 
long, and they do not have the power to expand credit. The main forms of regulation 
are via capital and liquidity requirements. These restrict the activities of financial 
institutions by requiring them to hold capital assets to back their trading and lending 
activity, and liquid assets to be able to repay depositors. Capital requirements are a 
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response to the Wall Street crash when trading on margin was identified as the main 
cause.  
 
Whatever normative theories of regulation claim, the actual coverage and level of 
regulation is a matter of power politics with the regulated institutions fighting hard 
against efforts to regulate them. For example, hedge funds have avoided regulation of 
their liquidity or capital by claiming that they were ‘private’ and take in money 
exclusively from the very wealthy who are well-informed investors and can afford to 
lose their investments. In fact this is inaccurate; since 2002 UK pension funds and 
insurance companies have been able to invest in hedge funds and by 2010 20% of 
hedge funds’ investment funds were supplied by pension funds.9 However, not only 
are there great differences  in the level of regulation between sectors of finance, but 
these encourage firms to change their form, their activities or their legal status to 
reduce their level of regulation and increase their profitability, i.e. to engage in 
‘regulatory arbitrage’.10  How this leads to the creation of the shadow banking sector 
is discussed below.  
 
The trend towards weaker regulation can be clearly seen from the following figures. 
Between 1968 and 2008 the capital ratio for UK banks fell from 15% to 8% and the 
liquidity ratio fell from 30% to 3% (data for ‘broad ratio’) or 15% to 3% (data for 
‘reserve ratio’) (Bank of England 2009: 8, 43). The median equity leverage ratio 
increased from 21:1 to 31:1 (for the ratio of assets to equity), between 2000 and 2008 
(FSA, 2009: 19) , or from 20:1 to 48:1  (for the ratio of assets to shareholders’ claims) 
(IBC, 2011: 128) These measures underestimate the degree of risk being run by banks 
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since they exclude assets which are held off balance sheet precisely so as to allow 
very much higher levels of leverage (FSA, 2009: 20). 
 
 
AGAINST THE CRITICAL URBANIST INTERPRETATION: B. US AND UK BANKS’  
BEHAVIOUR.  
 
Having sketched in the regulatory background we now examine US and UK banks’ 
role in the financial crisis, by focusing on new types of financial product, the creation 
of the shadow banking sector, and on the banks’ business model which shapes 
bankers’ attitudes to risk and reward. I shall argue that these are the three key sources 
of instability in the banking sector which, together with global macroeconomic 
imbalances, loose central bank policy, and weak regulation, are the prime cause of the 
financial crisis in these countries. 
 
‘Financial innovation’ - the rise of securitized credit and derivatives.   
 
The low interest rates of the mid-1990s ushered in a period in which banks sought 
ways of making good these losses by innovatory financial products. There were two 






The traditional model of bank lending is known as ‘originate and hold’: banks 
originate loans to companies and individuals against assets such as corporate 
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headquarters and housing and hold the loan until it is repaid. The new model is known 
as ‘originate and distribute’. This started in the corporate sector but by the late 1990s 




The concept is that the bank which owns the asset (e.g. a corporate or residential 
mortgage) sells it for cash to another financial institution or ‘structured investment 
vehicle’ (SIV) set up for the purpose. Typically these entities were located in the 
‘shadow banking sector’ (see below) and were not subject to regulatory control. This 
entity then issues securities to investors which are backed by the expected income 
flows, e.g. from mortgages, a process known as securitization. These securities or 
‘collateralized debt obligations’ (CDOs) are parcelled up and ‘tranched’ according to 
their degree of risk from AAA (least risk) downwards, and a credit-rating agency, 
paid by the issuer, confirms the level of risk of each tranche. The theoretical 
advantage of securitization for the financial system is that it spreads risks arising in 
particular regions, asset types and sectors of the economy across financial institutions 
of many types located throughout the country.  
 
The advantages of securitized credit for the original bank are twofold. First, it 
transfers risk: the original bank is no longer liable if households default on their 
mortgages, or corporations default on their loans. Instead, the entity which issues the 
securities takes on this risk. There can even be an incentive to the original bank not to 
pass on information about the riskiness of the loan in order to avoid future liability 
(Immergluck, 2009: 107). The importance of this is that if a bank loan stays with the 
original bank it is part of the denominator in the bank’s capital ratio, requiring more 
capital to be held, whereas if it is transformed into a securitized asset held by an 
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unregulated SIV this is not the case. This leads to the second advantage: the bank is 
enabled to expand its lending capacity. The sale of the original loan or mortgage 
increases the bank’s liquidity, allowing it to make new loans. So, for a given volume 
of deposits, a greater volume of loans can be generated.  The result is to expand the 
supply of credit. 
 
However, this scenario assumes that there is no connection between the original bank 
and the financial institution or SIV. In practice this may not be the case and the latter 
bodies can range from being legally separate and independent entities, to legally 
separate but wholly controlled entities, to wholly owned and wholly controlled 
subsidiaries of the original bank. These can be seen as different ways of reconciling 
the tension between banks’ wish to avoid regulation and minimize taxation, and their 
wish to draw on their reputation to help sell asset-backed securities. The result is that 
in a crisis if a SIV is legally independent but is perceived to be the responsibility of 
the bank, a bank may choose to support it in order to preserve its own reputation, even 
though legally it does not need to. Where this happens, the transfer of risk is less than 
it would otherwise be. 
 
Turning to the disadvantages of securitized credit, there were two problems 
concerning risk transfer. The first is that the underlying theory was based on 
mathematical models which proved inaccurate. In part they relied on assumptions 
which were not met, e.g. that there would not be a simultaneous decline in asset prices 
across the whole country; and in part they were based on data drawn from short 
periods of steady growth or on no data at all. The second problem is that the transfer 
of risk was less than expected. As explained above, banks often chose to use entities 
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which they controlled or had relations with to hold asset-based securities so that the 
transfer of risk was only on paper. In other cases, banks ended up holding CDOs 
because no buyer could be found. In particular, the least risky (or ‘super-senior’) 
CDOs could be hard to sell since the interest rates attached to them were too low to 
attract buyers, who were most attracted to the most risky CDOs offering high interest 
rates (Tett, 2009: 244). Goodhart teasingly uses the term ‘originate and pretend to 
distribute’ (2009: 54) to describe this situation, but this does not distinguish between 
the intentional and unintentional paths to holding rather than distributing, and ignores 
the critical role of the shadow banking system.  
 
Paradoxically, however, if securitization risks had been completely transferred to the 
shadow banking sector, this would have increased the instability of the financial 
system, given the lack of transparency and lack of regulation of that sector (FSA, 
2009: 18). 
 
The other problem with securitized credit was that since the credit-rating agencies 
were paid by the credit issuers they were incentivized to support issuers’ judgements 
of the riskiness of securities. They also became over-dependent on income from asset-
based credit issuers for their own financial survival (Immergluck, 2009: 116-120.)  It 
was assumed by some observers that the agencies’ concern for their own reputations 
would guarantee the quality of their work, but this proved not to be the case. Also 
there was a general intellectual failure to understand what risk was being rated 
(Goodhart, 2009: 17-19).
13
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Total securitized credit in the US grew from $400bn in 1996 to $2400bn in 2007, and 
in the UK new securitized credit rose from £20bn in 2000 to £180bn in 2007 (FSA, 
2009: 14)  One third of new securitized credit issued in the UK in 2006 and 2007 was 




The second type of innovative product, the derivative, is a contract concerning a 
future value, such as the price of a commodity, or the level of a share price, interest 
rate or currency, rather than a contract for the purchase or sale of the underlying 
commodity, share or currency itself. The contract may be entered into because the 
business needs to buy the commodity or foreign currency in the future and wishes to 
insure against the risk of future price increases or currency appreciation. ‘Hedging’ of 
this kind can be considered a normal business transaction. 
 
However, derivatives can also be purchased for speculative purposes. Firms with no 
business need for hedging can, for example, purchase an option to buy shares in 
another company, to buy a foreign currency, or to invest in sovereign debt at a given 
price in the future. Here, in effect, the firm is speculating on the future value of the 
company, the currency or the government’s ability to borrow. The firm deliberately 
takes on (potentially unlimited) risk in the hope of profit. When the entity purchasing 
the derivative is not regulated and when the existence of the transaction is unknown 
because it is not conducted on a public exchange, the potential risk to an individual 
firm can be very great.  
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At the systemic level, the effect on risk of derivative transactions depends on two 
factors. The total amounts involved are limited by the fact that there are two parties to 
every transaction, so for every loss made on a derivative transaction there is a 
potential gain. However, the incidence of this risk depends on the distribution of 
derivative losses, which will also depend on how the counterparty has laid off the 
risks on the transaction.
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 In practice, derivatives have been held largely in the 
shadow banking sector to avoid regulation so it is impossible have a realistic overall 
picture of the risks created by derivative trading.  
 
The world-wide scale of derivatives trading grew from $60tn in the mid-1990s to 
$600tn by 2007 (FSA, 2009: 81). (This compares with world GDP of $55tn in 2007, 
which is an indication of the dominance of derivatives held for speculative reasons.) 
But the net risk if parties default is estimated at ‘only’ $3tn (Bank of England, 2008: 
21), which is of the same order of magnitude as the total scale of securitized credit 
($2.4tn in the US). Derivatives can of course impact on the future underlying value in 
question, as in the case of currency speculation. As the FSA (2009) points out, 
insurance policies cannot be taken out by persons without an insurable interest in the 
object assured to avoid creating harmful incentive effects. It has been suggested that 




In sum, banks, under pressure on their profits, created securitized credit products of 
uncertain value (‘toxic assets’), and derivatives with vast potential risk whose 
distribution among financial institutions was unknown. It was the uncertain 
 22 
distribution of the risks caused by these innovations which in September 2008 
precipitated the breakdown in trust between financial institutions needed for 
continued trading. No sensible party could be expected to enter a contract with 
another party who might be bankrupted by being overloaded with toxic assets or 
derivative claims.  
 
The shadow banking sector 
 
The shadow banking sector has already been touched on because it refers to the 
institutional domain in which financial products such as securitized credit and 
derivatives are often held. However, there is a danger that it does not receive the 
recognition that it deserves in contributing to the financial crisis. Hence its separate 
treatment here.  
 
The unregulated, ‘shadow’ or ‘grey’ banking sector is not a marginal phenomenon as 
its name and ‘off-balance sheet’ character suggest but is arguably as, if not more, 
important than the regulated sector as a source of systemic instability.  Moreover it is 
in part a creation of the mainstream financial institutions in their attempts to avoid 
regulation and minimize taxation, as when they create hedge funds or SIVs which 
operate in the shadow sector (Blackburn, 2008, Farhi and Macedo Cintra, 2009). 
Mainstream financial institutions are thus also involved in the shadow sector. 
Needless to say this is not part of their public image and they are only too happy to 
dissociate themselves from the non-bank ‘other’. 
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All regulatory rules create boundaries between regulated and unregulated domains, 
and these act as incentives to regulatory arbitrage, i.e. to transfer activities to the 
unregulated (or less regulated) side (Goodhart, 2009: 101).  This is much more than 
an academic point since the scale of the incentives to make such transfers is 
enormous. The incentive is that capital and liquidity controls can be avoided, and if 
the entity conducting the activity is registered in a tax haven, there is a tax saving too 
(Shaxson, 2011: 8-32, 244-278.). (A disproportionate number of tax havens are in 
UK-controlled territories.)  
 
The attraction of SIVs used to hold securitized assets or derivative contracts is that 
they are in the shadow sector and are therefore more profitable. In fact it has been 
suggested that a key attraction of securitization and derivatives was not their 
theoretical capacity to reduce risk but the opportunity they gave to avoid regulation by 
moving activities into the shadow sector.
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 SIVs allowed banks to avoid or reduce 
regulation and increase profits in three ways (FSA, 2009: 21): a) capital does not need 
to be held in respect of off-balance sheet subsidiaries, so the expanded use of such 
entities allowed banks to grow without regard to (the admittedly weak) capital 
requirements, b) under Basel I regulations, entities that are financed by credit of under 
one year’s duration are not required to hold capital; SIVs were typically financed for 
364 days, and c) where SIVs are set up in tax havens they can avoid paying 
corporation tax. This is the case, for example, with the Jersey-based Granite trusts, 
worth £40bn, which are controlled but not owned by Northern Rock, and which were 
left untouched when Northern Rock was nationalized.  Thus the role of SIVs is 
inseparable from attempts to avoid regulation and to minimize taxation. 
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Estimates of the scale of the shadow sector are by definition hard to come by. In the 
US in 2007 SIVs, hedge funds, etc. controlled $6.5tn, compared with banks as a 
whole $10tn (Timothy Geithner speech 9 June 2008, cited in Tett, 2009: 263). In the 
UK the Turner report shows the growth of  SIVs, one element in this sector, as rising 
from $100bn to $300bn between 2003 and 2007 (FSA, 2009: 20), and 80% of EU 
hedge fund activity is conducted in the UK. Since Autumn 2008 the UK grey sector is 
considered to have shrunk, due to the decline in securitization, but it could expand 
again when conditions are favourable.  
 
The riskiness of the shadow banking sector has several sources.  The main reason is 
that the absence of capital, liquidity and leverage controls means that there are no 
built-in safety limits to speculative activity, and the value attributed to assets becomes 
hard to judge. A second reason is that the activity is funded using short-term credit 
which is more vulnerable to withdrawal. It was the drying up of short-term credit 
because of suspicion about the value of the ‘toxic’ assets held which precipitated the 
Northern Rock nationalization. Thirdly, the sector is set up ‘off-balance sheet’ which 
means holdings lack transparency and no body has oversight of the scale and 
incidence of risks.  
 
The threat which the shadow banking sector represented to the US and UK financial 
systems only became apparent too late. The fact that it was allowed to develop to the 
extent it did is likely to be linked to the fact that the mainstream banks were heavily 
involved in it, and exerted strong pressure to shield it from regulation.   
 
Banks’ business model and attitudes to risk and reward 
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Banks operate according to a business model in which success and remuneration is 
based on return on equity, or ‘shareholder value’. In contrast to the classical image of 
banks as taking in deposits, creating credit, and lending to households and businesses, 
it has been argued that banks today are engaged in ‘retail mass marketing and 
wholesale trading’ and have become ‘transaction-generating machines’ (Engelen et 
al., 2011: 115). Domestic customers are now targeted with the sale of all manner of 
policies and in the UK bank non-interest income as a proportion of net interest and 
non-interest income has risen to 53.9% in 2007, in the US to 39.3% and France to 
75.2% (Engelen et al 2011:116; Dymski, 2012a). The wholesale money market has 
become the major source of funds, and proprietory trading is a more significant 
activity.   The scale of the UK banking sector has grown to 500% of GDP. This 
compares with 400% for France, 200% for Germany and 80% for the US (Engelen et 
al, 2011: 226, dates of data not given).  Banks were very successful in maximizing 
return on equity in the 2000s, especially relative to other industrial sectors (Engelen et 
al, 2011: 103). Their return on equity was of the order of 20%, but their return on total 
assets was very modest, i.e. about 1% (Engelen et al 2011: 108-9). However, their 
success came about through their ability to expand their asset base via debt finance 
especially on wholesale markets, rather than equity expansion (IBC, 2011). Much of 
this borrowing is linked to the role of offshore financial bodies, set up to avoid 
regulation and taxation (IMF, 2009a). A key incentive to borrow is that interest paid 
on loans is deductable before taxes are calculated. In other words, wholesale 
borrowing rather than deposit-taking was the means they used to achieve profitability.  
The fact that borrowing came from within the financial sector  increased endogenous 
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risk in this sector. The Vickers report also notes that banks are currently under-
supplied with the loss-absorbing assets needed in a crisis.  
 
This business model has direct effects on banks’ internal structure and remuneration 
patterns (or what is sometimes known as ‘bonus culture’). The internal power balance 
between the departments of a bank favours those which generate the highest earnings, 
namely the trading departments (or investment bank type activities) where staff are 
incentivized by bonuses which relate directly to the short-term gains they make. The 
‘compensation ratio’ (between remuneration and total income) is often around 40% 
which encourages risky activity where profits are highest. Until recently, bonuses 
could not be ‘clawed back’ if bank performance turned out to be poor. Bonuses have 
attracted huge political opprobrium since as well as their multi-million pound level, 
they are also paid even when a bank is making a loss.
16
 The extent of distribution of 
income via salaries, bonuses and dividends, rather than their retention to increase the 
capital of the bank, and hence its lending capacity, has been a consistent complaint of 
the Bank of England (2010: 6).  
 
By contrast, back-office staff are less well paid and receive at best small bonuses. 
Departments responsible for risk management are marginalized since they threaten the 
earnings of the most powerful departments. (This was clear in the case of the HBOS 
risk control head who was sacked for raising doubts about the sustainability of the 
bank’s growth strategy.) However, Lepinay’s (2011) study of a French bank questions 
whether risk management departments were capable of understanding the risks being 
run and suggests that there was deliberate concealment of the riskiness of certain 
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products because to reveal the details would have given a competitive advantage to 
rivals.  
 
One of the more intriguing defences the banks have advanced is that the riskiness of  
their behaviour was unknown to them. In other words they were not concealing what 
they were doing from external actors but were genuinely in ignorance of what they 
were doing. There is some truth in this argument. In front of Parliamentary Select 
Committees, bank chief executives and chairmen have revealed their limited 
knowledge of how products worked, and how they relied on their middle level staff 
for such an understanding. As shown earlier, these innovative products were built on 
uncertain foundations, but these uncertainties were not communicated to, or 
understood by, senior bank staff. Any doubts about them were set aside because in the 
short term securitized credit and derivatives trading delivered profits growth, and 
bonus levels depended on the continuation of that growth. However, against this 
‘ignorance’ interpretation is the evidence that staff who questioned the growth 
strategies of banks or drew attention to the increasing risks being taken were 
marginalized or sacked. This suggests that there was a conscious attempt by bank 
leaders to run banks at very high levels of risk to maintain expansion and profits 
growth.  
 
What is interesting about analyses of bank behaviour in the last two decades is that 
there is no pretence that internal controls were effective. The assumption that banks’ 
self-interest in their own survival would rein in excessive risk-taking has proved to be 
unfounded. They no doubt believed that the UK was going through a golden age 
where failure was inconceivable, or that they were ‘too big to fail’ and that the state 
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would always step in to prevent a bank failure, a belief that proved well-founded in 
the UK in 2007-8, though in the US, the investment bank, Lehmans, was allowed to 
fail. The internal power structure of banks in which the highest earners have the 
greatest weight must have shaped these beliefs.  
 
A key factor in this banking culture is government support for the banks. The 
Financial Services Compensation Scheme which protects depositors up to £85,000 per 
institution is a direct benefit to individual savers, but it is a collective benefit for 
banks in that it smoothes the flow of deposits to them and does not discriminate 
between banks according to whether they undertake more or less risky activity.
17
 
Moreover, the lack of any separation between retail and investment functions in 
‘universal’ banks (which undertake both types of activity) means they are free to 
allocate funds from retail depositors to investment banking, with obvious implications 
for their willingness to lend to households and businesses.  
 
In brief, banks are run according to a business model in which growth and bonuses are 
interlinked and where there is little disincentive to excessive risk-taking. This also 
reflects the FSA’s light touch regulatory approach which did not challenge bank 
practices. 
 
Another insight into how banks operate can be gained from examining UK banks’ 
views of the financial crisis as reported to the House of Lords Economic Affairs 
Committee. Bank leaders have been swift to deny responsibility for their behaviour. 
Instead they have redirected blame: a) towards the external regulators (the FSA in the 
UK), who were supposed to have been regulating individual banks, b) towards their 
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own non-executive directors, for not standing up to the executive directors, c) towards 
representative groups of investors such as pension funds and insurance companies, for 





It is of course quite possible to find fault with all of these groups. The FSA has 
admitted its inadequate inspection of individual banks as in the case of Northern Rock 
(FSA, 2008) but claims to have learned from this experience (FSA, 2009). Select 
Committee reports have revealed the weakness of non-executive directors who are not 
appointed for long periods, who are expected to devote little time to the job, who lack 
research resources to challenge board members, who lack expertise, and who typically 
share the culture of those they are suppose to be checking (House of Commons, 2009; 
House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, 2009).  Investor activism is a relatively 
recent phenomenon and activist investors mainly have to be content with ‘symbolic’ 
victories due to the dominance of ‘passive’ shareholders who support the company 
board in every vote.   Lastly, auditing of the larger banks is carried out by one of the 
four main accountancy firms so competition is slight. Moreover, these firms also work 
as consultants to the banks as well as auditors; their consultancy income varies from 
9% to 34% for the six largest banks (House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, 
2009: Q345). Hence the accountancy firms be disinclined to probe too far.   
 
Overall, the blame directed by UK banks to these outside groups is consistent with the 
banks’ failure to acknowledge having any responsibility themselves. In January 2011, 
although the banking reforms introduced at UK and international level were minimal, 
Bob Diamond, chief executive of Barclays, argued before the Treasury Select 
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Committee that it was time to stop castigating the banks and to ‘move on’. Related to 
this, the UK Coalition government (2010- ) has blamed the previous Labour 
government for its economic mismanagement and for the need to introduce sharp 
public spending cuts, thereby diverting attention from the banks’ own role. 
 
THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: SUMMARY  
 
It has been argued that the prime cause of the US and UK financial crisis was the 
operation of the banking systems in the two countries which in a context of global 
imbalances, loose central bank monetary policy, light touch regulation and implicit 
government guarantees of a bailout, developed business models which rewarded 
extreme risk-taking. This led to the rapid expansion of securitization and trading in 
derivatives, and wholesale borrowing as risk was transferred from the mainstream 
banks into a shadow banking sector which escaped regulation and minimized taxation. 
In principle, these ‘innovative products’ were about reducing risk; in practice, because 
their values were obscure and their incidence unknown, they greatly increased 
systemic risk. The result was an unstable system which could have been triggered into 
crisis in a variety of ways.  
 
It is certainly true that subprime lending was one element of the credit expansion in 
the US which preceded the financial crisis and hence that it probably contributed to 
the crisis because subprime loans were one of the types of asset which was involved 
in the expansion of securitization. However they were not the only type of asset 
involved. As shown earlier, in terms of volume, subprime lending was dwarfed by 
other types of securitized credit and by the various kinds of derivative.  There are no 
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figures that would allow us to identify the precise causal contribution of these various 
factors.  
 
It is not being denied that investment funds flow internationally or that banks operate 
internationally, though they do so to varying extents.  But the critical urbanist 
explanation which emphases these processes and structures does not explain the 
particular severity of the financial crisis in the US and UK. Only an approach which 
emphasizes distinctive national conditions can do so. The fact that the US and UK 
have been at the epicentre of the financial crisis and that there has not been a global 
financial crisis supports the idea that the prime cause lies in the structure and 
dynamics of the banking system of these two countries.  
 
It is not being claimed that the different levels of financial crisis experienced in 
different countries can all be explained by their differing degrees of involvement in 
the UK and US practices outlined here. Some countries have not experienced 
financial crises (and ensuing economic crises) (Canada, Australia), while others were 
affected only minimally (China) On the other hand, there were countries whose 
financial crises were due to other specific national features, in combination with 
international forces. For Greece, the scale of public sector debt, which had been 
deliberately concealed, was crucial. In Iceland, the finance sector had grown to over 
1000% of GDP and involved banks where owners, borrowers and shareholders were 
fatally intertwined. In Spain, despite controls preventing banks from owning 
securitized assets, the key domestic causes were an enormous housebuilding boom (in 
2006 Spain built as many houses as France, Germany and the UK together) and the 
local savings banks whose lending policies were under political control (Garcia, 
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2010). Lastly, Ireland also had a rapid housebuilding boom in which a network of 
bankers, builders and politicians were involved.  This is not to deny that UK banks 
lent to Ireland or to Iceland but these countries together with Spain and Greece had 
financial crises with specific domestic features which were distinct from those in the 
UK and US.  The conditions described here for the US and UK are thus one route to 
financial crisis but not the only possible one.    
 
Hence we deny the ‘critical urbanist’ argument that the financial crisis was triggered 
by the subprime mortgage crisis and have suggested that, because of their 
understandable dislike of subprime lending, critical urbanist writers have jumped to 
the conclusion that it must have been central to the financial crisis, without 
demonstrating it. By staying on the familiar territory of mortgage lending they have 
failed to recognize the internal structural weaknesses of the US and UK financial 
systems which made them unsustainable. This reflects an underestimation of the 
degree of autonomy of developments within finance within global capitalism.
19
    
 
As Farhi and Macedo Cintra have written,  
‘The financial crisis that started in the US in mid-2007, as a result of 
increasing default rates and the devaluation of real estate property and of 
financial assets linked to the US subprime mortgages, has given renewed 
strength to the debate about the current architecture of the US and 
international financial system, its potential risks and its mechanisms of 
supervision and regulation. This specific architecture turned a classic credit 
crisis into a financial and banking crisis of vast proportions, reaching a 
systemic dimension.’ (2009: 2, emphasis added)  
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This quotation distinguishes the structure or architecture of the system in which the 
financial crisis broke out from the contributory processes, and argues that it is the 




ATTEMPTS AT REFORM 
 
It follows from the above analysis that, to be effective, reform attempts must be 
directed at changing the structure and dynamics of the financial system and not 
simply at sub-prime mortgage lending. The fact that the proposed reforms have had 
this wide scope is recognition of the limited causal role of the subprime crisis.  What 
progress has been made? For brevity, I will concentrate on the UK. 
 
Ring-fencing of banks 
 
In 2011 the Independent Banking (‘Vickers’) Commission reported. Its brief was to 
enquire into the systemic risks and level of concentration
21
 of the banking system 
(IBC, 2010, 2011). It rejected the complete separation of retail and investment 
banking in favour of ‘ring fencing’ these activities into two kinds of bank, but 
allowing them both to be owned by the same group. The report suggests that this 
would allow the group to support the retail bank from ‘group’ funds; it does not raise 
the question of draining funds from the retail bank to deal with problems in the 
investment bank. The solution also means that the group continues to benefit from the 
government guarantee to retail depositors, a significant subsidy in the current system. 
A key point is that proprietory trading, derivatives, and securitized assets would not 
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be permitted in retail banks; however, there are many grey areas concerning the 
allocation of activities between retail and investment banks.
22
 The Report also 
requires divestment of bank branches by the Lloyds HBOS group which was created 
as a crisis response, and required the overriding of competition regulations. A 
weakness of the report is that the ring-fenced system need only be in place by 2019. 
Unlike all the Report’s other recommendations, which are the outcome of careful 
argument, the 2019 date is not. This suggests that it was a political judgement the 
Commission was asked to incorporate but for which it could not give a reasoned 
argument. The Coalition government said it would accept the Report’s  
recommendations but, following lobbying, stated that the most internationalised banks 
would not need higher capital ratios, rejected the idea of a nationally set leverage 
ratio, and allowed retail banks to conduct some risky activities. By 2012 there was 
mounting criticism of this watering down of the report’s recommendations. By 
Autumn 2012 the bill to implement the reforms was still to start its legislative path. 
 
 
Form and strength of regulation 
 
A new system or financial regulation will be introduced in 2013, splitting the FSA 
into an industry-facing body, the Prudential Regulation Authority, which will be part 
of the Bank of England, and a consumer-facing body, the Financial Conduct 
Authority. This solution was advocated by the Conservative Party when in opposition. 
The Bank has established a Financial Policy Committee in parallel with its existing 
Monetary Policy Committee to recognize its new responsibility. This structure has the 
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advantage of concentrating information on financial institutions in one place, unlike 
the previous split between Bank and FSA.  
However, more important, are the planned changes in the type of regulation. On paper 
these are radically different; the question is whether in practice they will be 
deliverable.   Whereas in the past regulation was reactive and ‘the presumption was 
that supervisors should not be exercising judgement on what might happen in the 
future; this was for management’ (BoE/FSA, 2011: 5), the PRA will make such 
judgments. This means a ‘hands-on’ approach with extensive access to firms’ data 
and powers to force a firm to adopt the PRA’s views rather than its own, for example 
about levels of capital, liquidity, riskiness of new products, the firms’ risk 
management structure and culture. These will be backed up by fines, legal powers and 
the power to close down a firm’s activities. Firms which have greater capacity for 
systemic destabilization will be subject to closer regulation. ‘The PRA’s most senior 
supervisors will be closely and routinely involved in supervision of the most 
significant firms.’ (BoE/FSA, 2011: 12) Hence the newspaper headline ‘FSA to sit in 
on Board meetings.’ Firms are not expected to engage in ‘creative compliance’ or 
regulatory arbitrage (BoE/FSA, 2011: 4). This means a sea change from past 
practices. The new pattern of regulation amounts to something approaching ‘joint 
management’, and must be unique. 23 It addresses the self-destructive tendency of 
financial firms, but raises questions about its feasibility due to limited PRA resources 
and firms’ concealment of information.    
 
In addition, in 2009 an Act was introduced to specify the powers of the Bank of 
England, Treasury and FSA in relation to bank resolution, i.e. how to proceed in the 
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Capital, liquidity and leverage controls 
 
All of these controls have the effect of reining in bank activity to a more stable level. 
In 2010 and 2011 the G20 approved the Bank of International Settlements ‘Basel III’ 
rules which require higher tier one and core tier one capital ratios (8% and 6%, 
instead of 4% and 2%), an additional 2.5% for systemically important banks, and 
tougher criteria for what counts as capital. Engelen et al note that they are ‘much less 
stringent’ than those initially proposed (2011, 114). However, these too will only be 
fully implemented in 2019. These capital ratios are below current UK banks’ capital 
ratios which indicates the feebleness of the reform, and the character of the G20 
decision-making process which tends to proceed by consensus. The ‘rational’ 
argument for these limited measures was that at a time when depression threatens it 
was dangerous to introduce controls which might reduce bank lending. But this is 
special pleading which reflects lobby influence. Banks currently have a surplus of 
funds and are currently criticized for refusing to lend. They have failed to meet 
promises to lend to small businesses, and have preferred to use money borrowed at 
0.5% for proprietory trading in derivatives and other speculative activities. 
 
Interestingly, the Vickers report is critical of the Basel III capital ratios and proposes 
higher levels for retail banks which it thinks should be subject to national rather than 
international controls (IBC, 2011: 91-3). The Report’s criticism of debt finance does 
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not appear in its final recommendations, but it recommends that equities should rise to 
10% of assets (compared with the Basel III minimum of 4.5%) (IBC, 2011).  
 
Basel III also includes a proposal to study liquidity ratios and leverage ratios and 
introduce proposals by 2019, but the chances that they will diverge much from current 





The global total of derivative contracts has increased from $600tn to $700tn between 
2007 and 2010 (FSA, 2009: 81; BIS, 2011). There have been national level 
discussions of the need for central registries, central clearing, and a higher capital 
requirement for over the counter trading but no real progress has been made in the 




From 2007 to 2010 the global total value of securitized assets has fallen from $12.1tn 
to $3.4tn (IMF, 2011). The European Banking Authority has required originators of 
securitized credit to retain 5% of the value, as has the US Dodd-Frank Act. Otherwise, 







In 2011 controls were introduced requiring 50% of bonuses to be paid in shares with 
40% spread over 3-5 years ahead, and making them dependent on bank performance. 
However, the effect of these controls was limited by banks raising basic salaries and 
reducing the role of bonuses. The PRA will also apply the EU directive introduced in 
January 2011 concerning remuneration principles and disclosure, but this does not  
concern the level of salaries and bonuses. In 2012 some banks announced they would 
link staff salaries to customer satisfaction rather than sales acheived. 
 
Shadow banking sector 
 
The importance of this sector was recognized in only two places in the Vickers Report 
(IBC, 2011: 90, 134). In each case it was pointed out that if stricter regulation were 
adopted it would force institutions to move activities into the shadow banking sector. 
The report contained no proposals to regulate it or reduce its size. In contrast, Chow 
and Surti’s analysis of the Vickers and Volcker solutions concludes that ‘enhancing 
oversight of the shadow banking sector is essential to prevent migration of systemic 
risk in response to tighter constraints on regulated banks’ business models (2011: 31). 
At international level the IMF (2009b) and BIS (2010) are trying to persuade national 
governments to adopt reforms. The G20 based FSB has published a set of 
recommendations which include obliging banks to include on balance sheet the 
liabilities of all entities they sponsor, limiting the size of these exposures, and 
preventing banks from giving implicit support to non-sponsored entities (FSB, 
2011b). They are also seeking to gather data on the operation of hedge funds. From 
past experience, these are not likely to make the transition to policy very soon. 
However, in 2010 the EU passed a Directive on Alternative Investment Fund 
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Managers which will come into effect in 2013. It will impose new regulations on 
hedge funds and private equity concerning leverage, transparency and remuneration 
and its effect will be greatest in the UK where hedge funds are concentrated. How 
much bite it will have is not yet known. In 2012 the IMF wrote that ‘Looking ahead, a 
great deal will depend on whether the higher-risk activity—investment banking 
and trading—shrinks in size (contrary to current trends) and whether it remains in the 
banking sector or shifts to nonbank institutions. If activities move out of the banking 
sector, greater attention to regulation and supervision standards in the nonbank 
sector will be required to ensure that risks are properly addressed. If risks remain 
within the banking sector, the effects of increased concentration or the 
entrenchment of too-important-to-fail institutions will need to be considered’ (IMF, 
2012, p.18). 
 
‘Too big to fail’ and ‘too interconnected to fail’ 
 
These two problems remain despite the Basel III reforms (Chow and Surti, 2011). In a 
rational world, providing headquarters for major banks (famously described by 
Mervyn King as ‘global in life’ and ‘national in death’) would be recognized as a 
collective responsibility, and a limit placed on the maximum size for the banks 
headquartered in a particular country, individually and collectively.  In the absence of 
such a measure, there is nothing to stop governments from attracting bank 
headquarters and encouraging the growth of ‘global champions’, such as RBS, or to 
stop banks optimizing their locational choice without regard for the effects on macro-
financial stability.  
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The question is whether the combination of ring-fencing, stronger regulation and 
small changes to capital ratios will change the business model used in banks. The lack 
of controls on liquidity and leverage, the incentivization of debt-based funding, the 
failure to touch the shadow banking sector, the continuing role of bonuses in 
encouraging growth and risk-taking, the too big/too interconnected to fail problem, 
and the choice of ring–fencing, as opposed to separation, which will leave banking 
groups vulnerable to decisions made in their investment banks, are so many reasons 





Overall, the slow pace of reform of the banking system shows the continuing 
dominance of the finance sector over government, relative to households and business 
who have no answer to their question of why banks were bailed out when they were 
not. It would be satisfying to be able to describe the power structures and lobbying 
activity that have led to this outcome, but this is impossible to do. The U.S. practice of 
recruiting top economic and financial officials from banks, e.g. Henry Paulson, the 
Treasury secretary was a former Goldman Sachs chief executive, is well known. In 
the UK ties between the City and government officials are less direct but no less 
effective in ensuring that the government adopts City views as national interests. 124 
members of the House of Lords are paid by financial firms or have financial clients 
and it is estimated the UK banking industry spent £92 mn on lobbying in 2011 (The 
Guardian, 10 and 11 July 2012.) One empirical study of US bank lobbying by Igan et 
al (2009) shows a strong correlation between the riskiness of the bank’s activities and 
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the level of their lobbying contributions. Likewise, in the UK, 51% of donations to the 
Conservative Party in 2010 came from the City and six of the largest ten donors were 
from hedge funds, which were particularly vulnerable to tighter regulation (The 
Guardian, 9 February 2011). This suggests that while major financial institutions can 
rely on inside track lobbying, less well-established bodies have to rely on visible 
forms of lobbying.   
 
The slow pace of reform also shows the incapacity of supranational organizations 
such as the G20, BIS, IMF and EU to take radical steps. As has been shown, some 
issues have barely been recognized (the shadow banking sector, apart from hedge 
funds), while those that have been addressed have been addressed in a feeble way.   
The IMF’s October 2012 Global Financial Stability report is very pessimistic about 
the extent of reform. 
 
This means that most of the drivers of the financial crisis remain unchanged. The 
transformation of the financial crisis into the economic crisis, has led European 
governments to give priority to the resolution of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis 
and the implementation of austerity policies. The result is that the need for urgent 
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1 There is some unclarity about the terminology. Some writers use terms such as 
‘predatory loans’ or ‘high risk’ loans. Writers who use the term ‘predatory loan’ (e.g. 
Newman, 2009) do not say whether all subprime loans are predatory or if not what 
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distinguishes those which are, or alternatively whether predatory simply indicates 
moral disapproval.  Immergluck sees subprime loans as part of a wider group of ‘high 
risk loans’ (2009: 2) and does not use the term predatory. In the UK the term 
subprime is not in current use, but some common UK practices such as low initial 
interest rates rising after a fixed period are equivalent to the ‘teaser rates’ which some 
US writers identify as features of predatory loans.  
2 See Hernandez (2009) for a summary of this work. In contrast, UK work has 
focused more on the house and neighbourhood than on ethnic minorities. For 
evidence on red-lining in the UK see Boddy (1980: 68-9). 
 
3
 In the UK in 2007 45% of mortgages were given without any income being stated, 
and for the period from 2007 to early 2010 the figure was ‘nearly 50%’ (Guardian, 13 
May 2009, FSA press release, 13 July 2010) but the proposed response is to be more 
rigorous in judging borrowers’ ability to pay rather than to abandon risk-based pricing 
(FSA, 2010).  
4
 To describe risk-based pricing as a theory rather than an economic practice seems 
odd but perhaps it is necessary to their claims about its wider significance.  
 
5
 As suggested above, UK mortgage lending frequently departed from the risk-based 
pricing norm, but while this may have aggravated the financial crisis in the UK no-
one has claimed that it was a central factor as is claimed for subprime lending in the 
US.  
6
 More information is provided on these below. 
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7 In the UK, figures for actual repossession on all mortgages were 0.3% in 2008, 
indicating the very different scale of mortgage problems. 
8
 In 2011, as fines levied by the FSA on banks rose, the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
announced that in future they would go to the Treasury rather than stay with the FSA 
and  reduce the size of City firms contributions to it. 
9 The source of this figure is a personal communication from the Association of 
Alternative Investment Managers in 2010.  Following the period of declining equity 
returns, pension funds and insurance companies were keen to invest in ‘alternative 
asset classes’ which gave greater scope for profit (and were more risky). In 2006 3% 
of UK pension fund assets were held in hedge funds, and in that year Paul Myners (at 
that time a hedge fund manager, later to join the Labour government as City Minister) 
stated that pension funds should be able to hold up to 20% of their assets in  
‘alternative asset classes’.   
10
 The UK is generally seen as more weakly regulated than the US and this has 
facilitated the growth of the Eurobond market, of offshore activity, and of banking 
secrecy (Shaxson, 80-102, 247-250). See also the comment that ‘London became a 
satellite for transactions by large US banks: “the place where you could do what you 
couldn’t do back home: a place of financial arbitrage” ’ (Farhi and Macedo Cintra, 
2009: 4.)  
11
 Strictly speaking what was new was more complex types of securitized credit 
(Turner, 2010). 
12 For a description of its rise, see Tett (2009: 48-192) and Wainwright (2009). 
 
13
 For a more detailed analysis of securitization see Turner (2010). 
 49 
                                                                                                                                            
14
 In the US 97% of the value of derivatives held by commercial banks in 2010 was 
held by the top five such banks (Engelen et al, 2011: 61). 
15 According to an academic specialist, ‘90% of the innovation there [in the 
derivatives market] was pure regulatory arbitrage’…I do not see a lot of merit into 
most of the derivative work created. Second, I am convinced that however they are 
described as very complex, part of the reason they are complex is that they were 
exactly designed to go around regulation.’ (Prof Enrico Peretti in House of Lords 
Economic Affairs Committee, 2009: Q222) 
16
 And even when the bank is 84% state–owned as in the case of RBS which paid 100 
bankers £1m or more and paid £1bn in bonuses despite making losses of £1.1bn for 
2010 (The Guardian, 28 February 2011). 
17
 Between 2002 and 2007 it is estimated that the government subsidy to the world’s 
largest banks was $70bn/year  (50% of average pre-tax profits), and that this rose to 
$700bn in 2009 (Haldane, 2012.). 
18
 It has also emerged that after responsibility for bank supervision passed to the FSA, 
auditors were no longer contacted by the FSA as they were when the BoE was in 
charge (House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, 2009: Q305). 
19
 See Dymski (2012b) for a similar argument. 
20
 In this chapter the emphasis has been on the ‘normal’ running of banking systems. 
However, over time the role of  tolerated abuses and criminality have become 
increasingly apparent. Individual traders have been taken to court for bringing multi-
billion pound losses to their banks (Societe Generale, UBS, JP Morgan), their defence 
being that breaching risk limits was an accepted practice.  UK banks have had to 
compensate customers for mis-selling financial products (about £10bn in 2011 and 
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2012 for mis-selling payment protection polices). In Summer 2012 Standard 
Chartered was fined £220mn for transactions with Iran, HSBC £445mn for laundering 
drugs money - the FSA had published a 2011 report suggesting there was a lax 
attitude to such transactions – and Barclays was fined £290mn for its role in setting 
LIBOR, an internationally-used yardstick, with up to 10 other banks still to be fined. 
US prosecutors have taken a lead in this and  have suggested London was a ‘wild 
west’ where anything went. This has led to a demand for criminal sanctions against 
individuals, and the Serious Fraud Office is investigating the LIBOR setting process.  
21
 The largest five banks accounted for 80% of residential mortgages in 2009 and 85% 
of current accounts in 2010 (IBC, 2010). 
22
 The US Dodd-Frank Act 2010 which was passed  more rapidly than UK legislation 
is potentially stronger in its controls on banks.  It re-introduces the separation of retail 
and investment banks (the ‘Volcker rule’) and prevents institutions receiving federal 
deposit guarantees from engaging in proprietory trading or investing in hedge funds or 
private equity. However, its implementation remains open to negotiation.  The latter is 
an example of the general point that although the UK and US have contrasting styles 
of regulation in many areas (less and more law-based; more and less based on 
negotiation) in practice there is a great deal of convergence due to discretion in the 
application of US laws. 
23
 In March 2012 the FSA was already demonstrating  its new powers by challenging 
the capacity of the Co-operative group to absorb 632 Lloyds branches , trebling its 
branch network.  
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24
 The Eurozone crisis has led to increasing coordination among Eurozone central 
banks which could eventually lead to higher regulatory standards than those in the UK 
being imposed by the European Central Bank. However, this remains some way off.  
